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Purpose: Across the United States, a large percentage of school 
districts are in need of facility improvements to provide safe and 
adequate buildings to facilitate student learning. To finance new 
construction, school districts traditionally have put proposals 
before local voters to fund construction through issuing long-term 
bonds to finance near-term construction. However, past literature 
indicates that there are few variables that are associated with bond 
election outcomes that are under the influence of school 
administrators. The purpose of this study was to examine the 
factors most associated with passing or failing a school district 
capital facility finance bond in the state of Texas from 1997 
through 2009.  
Research Methods: We analyzed all proposed school bonds in 
Texas from 1997-2009, n=2,224, using a logistic regression 
discrete time hazard model to model the probability of passing a 
bond on the first, second or third attempt, while controlling for 
multiple types of variables such as bond, district and community 
characteristics, as well as specific election characteristics. 
Findings: We found that the first attempt of a bond is the mostly 
likely to succeed, as well as bonds that propose renovations and 
debt refinancing, or are at the top of the ballot. Also, while percent 
population over age 65 was negatively related to bond passage, 
percent Asian and Hispanic students was positively related. 
Implications for Research and Practice: Using past research and 
our findings, we propose a mediated model of school bond 
passage, and provide specific recommendations for administrators 
looking to pass needed facility construction bonds, including 
focusing on passing the bond on the first attempt and proposing 
only a single bond that includes all requests. 
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In the United States, PK-12 public school districts generally 
finance the construction of new school facilities through voter-
approved local school bond elections, in which the school district 
proposes to issue a certain amount of long-term debt to fund the 
near-term construction of new schools, facilities and renovations 
                                                 
1
 This document is a pre-print of this manuscript, which was 
originally published in the journal Educational Administration 
Quarterly. Citation: Bowers, A.J., Lee, J. (2013) Carried or 
Defeated? Examining the Factors that Predict School District Bond 
Elections in Texas, 1998-2009. Educational Administration 
Quarterly, 49(5),732-767. doi: 10.1177/0013161X13486278 
2
 Teachers College, Columbia University; Bowers@tc.edu; 525 W. 
120th Street, New York, New York 10027.  
ORCID: 0000-0002-5140-6428, ResearcherID: C-1557-2013 
 
(Duncombe & Wang, 2009; Sielke, 2003; Sielke, Dayton, Holmes, 
& Jefferson, 2001). Studies on the estimates of the unmet school 
capital construction needs across the states have indicated that the 
majority of U.S. school districts are in need of at least some 
renovations to their existing schools, while a large percentage need 
new schools constructed to meet the safety, security and basic 
facility requirements of their school districts and communities 
(Arsen & Davis, 2006; Crampton, 2003; Crampton, Thompson, & 
Hagey, 2001; Holt, 2009; NCES, 2000). While there is a fairly 
wide literature aimed at school and district administrators with 
normative models from “lessons learned” to suggestions on “how 
to pass your bond” (Bauscher, 1993; Boschee & Holt, 1999; Davis 
& Tyson, 2003; Dunne, Reed, & Wilbanks, 1997; Holt, 2009; Holt, 
Wendt, & Smith, 2006; Ingle, Johnson, & Petroff, 2011; Ingle, 
Johnson, & Petroff, 2012; Johnson & Ingle, 2009; Kastory & 
Harrington, 1996; Kraus, 2009; Lentz, 1999; Mathison, 1998) 
recent empirical research is sparse on exactly what factors are most 
associated with passing or failing a school facilities bond. 
 
A History of Research on School Bond Elections 
Interestingly, a fairly large amount of research on the factors most 
associated with passing or failing a school bond was conducted in 
the U.S. during the 1960s and early 1970s, as the “baby-boomer” 
generation matriculated through the public school system and 
districts needed to build schools to accommodate the demographic 
shifts in their communities, culminating in large summary studies 
in the mid-1970s (Alexander & Bass, 1974), including the 
extensive literature review and theory-building study by Piele and 
Hall (1973). In their review, they synthesized the work of over one 
hundred different studies and worked to create a theory of voter 
behavior as it relates to passing school bonds. From a theory 
perspective, they postulated that there were two major 
determinants to the outcome of a school referenda; who was most 
likely to participate versus who was most likely to vote “yes” 
(Piele & Hall, 1973). This included four different variables as they 
relate to the voter, including voter age, socio-economic status, 
education, and ethnicity.  
 
First, middle to older-aged voters were more likely to participate. 
Conversely, they were also more likely to not vote in favor of the 
bond, due in part to not having children currently in the school and 
being more likely to be in general opposition to new taxes while 
younger voters were more likely to have children in the schools 
and support new facilities, relying on a few central studies, such as 
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1964b; Lipset, 1963). 
Second, higher socio-economic status related to both stronger 
participation and likelihood of voting yes, as did the third variable, 
higher education levels (Alexander & Bass, 1974; Carter & 
Ruggels, 1966; Minar, 1966).  And fourth, Piele and Hall (1973) 
found across multiple studies that by ethnicity, white voters were 
more likely to participate, while African American voters were 
more likely to vote yes, such as (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & 
Stokes, 1964a; Lipset, 1963). These cross-study findings provided 
evidence to help describe generalizations about participation and 
favorable voting habits, however they provided little in the way of 
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direction for districts wishing to pass a bond, since the variables 
related to participation and yes voting were both very similar. 
Thus, according to the theory postulated by Piele and Hall, because 
participation is closely linked to yes voting, attempting to 
positively influence the bond election by working to increase voter 
turnout would “produce a relatively greater representation of those 
less likely to favor school financial elections… as an increase in 
participation yields a more representative sample of the total 
eligible population” (Piele & Hall, 1973) (p.151). Thus, Piele and 
Hall also provided a theory focused on the bond election as the unit 
of analysis as a means to provide malleable variables that could be 
used to help increase the likelihood that voters would support the 
school bond. 
 
Piele and Hall (1973) provided evidence in their review towards a 
model of bond passage that included district and election 
characteristics. Interestingly, for district characteristics, they found 
that district enrollment as well as the pupil/teacher ratio was not 
related to election outcomes, focusing on two main studies,  (Beal, 
1966; Minar, 1966). For the characteristics of the election, these 
studies found that the time of year of the election was unrelated to 
the election outcome while evidence on the effect of the size of the 
bond proposal (in dollars) was mixed, with some studies showing 
no effect while others demonstrated a significant negative effect 
(Beal, 1966). In addition, as to the effect of the wording of the 
bond and what was requested, findings across studies were mixed, 
in that some studies argued that there was no effect (Beal, 1966), 
while others argued that there may be an effect, but only in small 
districts with specific bond requests (Barbour, 1966).  
 
Thus, in sum, Piele and Hall (1973) painted a fairly discouraging 
picture of the ability of a school district to influence the outcome 
of school bond elections, other than in the negative. Piele and Hall 
set forth an apparent paradox for school districts looking to pass 
their bond. They theorized that community support for a local bond 
election in a school district is constant, with fairly intact groups 
that will vote yes or no, based mostly on demographics, while at 
the same time there was little evidence to show that factors under 
the influence of the district (election timing, bond amount, 
purpose, and wording) were associated with final bond outcomes. 
However, while Piele and Hall’s (1973) study was a foundational 
and exhaustive study at the time, there are multiple issues with 
their work. First is that the study is dated, with the vast majority of 
the studies they cite analyzing data from the 1950s and 1960s. 
While not a problem in-and-of itself, the communities included in 
their study have experienced broad changes in their demography, 
as has the entire U.S., over the intervening 50 years. Second, the 
analyses included in their study focused almost exclusively on 
descriptive statistics only, with few studies using inferential 
statistics. Third, sample sizes were relatively small, intact and 
cross-sectional across the vast majority of their studies reviewed, 
hampering the ability to generalize across contexts and into the 
present.  
 
Recent Research on Passing or Failing School District Facility 
Bonds 
Since Piele and Hall (1973), literature on the factors most 
associated with passing or failing school district bond elections has 
been sparse. However, a small and growing body of recent 
research has begun to focus on updating this research domain on 
facility bonds (Beckham & Maiden, 2003; Bowers, Metzger, & 
Militello, 2010a, 2010b; Johnson & Ingle, 2009; Sielke, 1998; 
Zimmer, Buddin, Jones, & Liu, 2011; Zimmer & Jones, 2005). As 
a way to begin to address the main tension described in Piele and 
Hall’s theory of the constant ratio of a community’s yes voters 
combined with little evidence that election or bond characteristics 
influence bond outcomes, the more recent research has turned from 
the voter as the unit of analysis, as it was in Piele and Hall (1973), 
to the bond as the unit of analysis. This has allowed recent 
researchers to focus on the factors most associated with passing or 
failing a school bond, rather than focus on theories around school 
district median voter behavior (Berkman & Plutzer, 2005; Dunne, 
et al., 1997; Fort, 1988; Fort & Bunn, 1998; Rubinfeld, 1977), such 
as rational choice voter theory (Blais, 2000), in an attempt to build 
theory specifically associated with school bonds and to inform 
administrator practice to help schools find the funding they need to 
build adequate facilities for their students. Thus, this literature has 
two overlapping constituencies, the researcher focused on the 
theory of why and how bonds come to be passed, and the 
practitioner looking for specific generalizable, and applicable 
findings that they can apply to help them pass their bond, or at the 
least decrease its risk of defeat at the election polls.  
 
The more recent literature, while sparse, has used logit or probit 
regression analysis and longitudinal datasets to examine three main 
aspects of passing or failing school capital facility construction 
bonds including 1) longitudinal analysis, 2) examining district and 
community factors, and 3) examining specific aspects of the bond 
or election. First, recent innovations in longitudinal data analysis 
has allowed researchers to include the analysis of large multi-year 
state-wide datasets, reducing sample bias since the entire 
population of bonds in a state is examined over a specified period, 
and to examine the practice of school districts floating and then 
refloating a bond that failed on the first attempt. In many instances, 
once a bond has failed, a school district will attempt the bond 
election again, in the hopes that the electorate is more favorable on 
a different day (Dunne, et al., 1997). In a study of 169 Michigan 
bonds between 1993 and 1994, Sielke (1998) found that the 
number of attempts was not significant on the likelihood of passing 
a bond, controlling for other variables in the model, such as the 
district property value, expenditures, debt payments, and amount 
of the bond. However, Bowers et al. (2010a) argued that including 
number of attempts in a logistic regression did not appropriately 
control for the conditional nature of the data represented by floated 
and then refloated bonds. The data is conditional because a bond is 
only eligible to be a “refloat” if it has failed previously. Thus, these 
authors used discrete-time hazard modeling to estimate the effect 
of floating and then refloating a failed bond a second, or even a 
third time, analyzing all 505 bonds proposed in Michigan from 
2000-2005 (Bowers, et al., 2010a), and then expanding the study to 
all 789 Michigan bonds proposed between 1998-2006 (Bowers, et 
al., 2010b). They found that a bond is most likely to pass on the 
first attempt, controlling for other variables in their model. This 
finding expands the theory of bond passage to longitudinal models, 
examining district bond and election behavior, providing an 
avenue to begin to address the malleable factors of a bond that are 
under the control of district administration that may be associated 
with bond passage, such as floating or refloating.  
 
Nevertheless, as the second main thread across the recent studies, 
community factors have been shown to be significant predictors of 
school bond passage, with some communities experiencing 
favorable election climates, while others disproportionally 
experience what could be termed hostile voting environments in 
which the most likely outcome for the bond is failure. In 
replication of Piele and Hall (1973), the socio-economic status of 
the school district was shown in the Michigan studies to be 
positively related to bond passage, such that as SES increases 
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across the community, the odds of passing a bond increase 
(Bowers, et al., 2010b; Sielke, 1998). In replication of the district 
SES finding, Zimmer et al. (2011) examined community median 
income and community poverty in their study of 343 bonds in 
Michigan from 1999-2001, finding similar significant effects on 
percent yes voters and bond passage. Also in replication of Piele 
and Hall (1973), recent studies confirmed that district enrollment 
was not a significant predictor of bond passage, including the 
Michigan studies (Bowers, et al., 2010b; Sielke, 1998; Zimmer, et 
al., 2011) as well as a study of all 522 bonds in Oklahoma between 
1995 and 2000 (Beckham & Maiden, 2003). Interestingly, the 
long-term debt of the district has been shown to be a positive and 
significant predictor of bond passage (Bowers, et al., 2010b; 
Zimmer, et al., 2011; Zimmer & Jones, 2005).  
 
Continuing with a focus on Michigan, Zimmer and Jones (2005) 
examined 906 school bonds in Michigan from 1990 through 1998, 
and showed that the more long-term district debt, the more likely a 
district is to pass their bond, with this finding recently replicated 
with Michigan bonds from 1999-2001 (Zimmer, et al., 2011). 
Bowers et al. (2010b) confirmed and updated this finding with 
more recent data from the 2000’s in Michigan (1998-2006), 
postulating that districts with higher amounts of long-term debt are 
more favorable towards passing school bonds, since they have 
demonstrated in the past that they are willing to tax themselves in 
support of district requests. Furthermore, district locale has been 
shown to be strongly related to bond passage rates in Michigan 
(Bowers, et al., 2010a, 2010b; Zimmer, et al., 2011; Zimmer & 
Jones, 2005), with rural districts experiencing lower odds of 
passing a bond controlling for the other variables in the models, 
while small towns appear to experience the worst odds of all. For 
Michigan, these differences in bond passage rates between district 
locales may be due in-part to the competition between school 
districts brought about through Michigan’s competitive student 
choice market (Arsen, Clay, Devaney, & Fulcher-Dawson, 2005; 
Arsen & Davis, 2006; Militello, Metzger, & Bowers, 2008). And 
finally, from the perspective of the community environment, while 
Piele and Hall (1973) detailed findings around the significant 
demographic factors of voter age as well as ethnicity, only Zimmer 
and Jones (2005) and Zimmer et al. (2011) included percent of 
population over age 65 in their models and found that it was 
negative and significant in the late 1990s, but was not significant in 
Michigan from 1999-2001, examining the effect of the perceived 
negative impact of older voters on school finances (Berkman & 
Plutzer, 2005; Button & Rosenbaum, 1989; Duncombe, Robbins, 
& Stonecash, 2003; Glass, 2008). Zimmer et al. (2011) is the only 
recent study to include ethnicity, and found no relationship 
between student ethnicity and bond passage in Michigan. In 
addition, Bowers et al. (2010b) found that the percent of the 
population with only a high school degree was negatively related 
to bond passage in Michigan from 1999-2006, while Zimmer et al. 
(2011) found no relationship between bond passage and the 
percent of the community with a bachelor’s degree or higher in 
Michigan from 1999-2001. 
 
The final main thread across the recent studies on school bond 
elections has focused on six main election characteristics, 
including refloats, amount of the bond, bond wording, day of the 
year, voter turnout, and ballot number. It is the election 
characteristics that are most under the control of the district 
administration. First, as outlined above, the recent research on 
refloating a bond has demonstrated a significant negative effect on 
refloats. In comparison, other election characteristics have not been 
as clear-cut. The second main election characteristic studied has 
been the associated influence of the size of the bond issue on the 
probability of passing a bond. Results were unclear in the review 
by Piele and Hall (1973), with some studies noting a significant 
negative effect, while others demonstrated no relationship. More 
recently, from the Michigan studies, Sielke (1998) did not find a 
relationship with two years of bond data from 1993-1994. 
However, amount of the bond was negative and significant in two 
of the more recent Michigan studies from 1999-2006 that included 
the variable (Bowers, et al., 2010a, 2010b) but was not significant 
in Michigan from 1999-2001 (Zimmer, et al., 2011) or in 
Oklahoma (Beckham & Maiden, 2003), indicating that controlling 
for the other variables in the models, larger bonds may fail more 
often when examining long-term data.  
 
Third, as noted by Piele and Hall (1973), that while a school 
district may have specific needs that must be included within a 
bond proposal, bond wording is one of the most easily controlled 
aspects of the bond, however it has not been the subject of many of 
the recent studies, except for Beckham and Maiden (2003) and 
Zimmer et al. (2011). In the Beckham and Maiden (2003) study, 
they aimed to assess the effect of including wording about 
technology on the probability of passing school facilities bonds in 
Oklahoma between 1995-2000, and found that including wording 
pertaining to technology on the bond was associated with a small 
but significant increase in the probability of passing the bond. 
However, Bowers et al. (2010b) attempted to replicate this finding 
for Michigan bonds, and found that inclusion of technology 
wording was not significantly related to the likelihood of bond 
passage. Zimmer et al. (2011) examined bond wording in 
Michigan from 1999-2001 and showed that controlling for the 
other variables in their model, bonds that contained wording 
pertaining to maintenance and operations had an increased 
probability of passing, while bonds with wording pertaining to 
band and art equipment, as well as parking lots, had a higher 
probability of failing. These studies indicate that while bond 
wording may be a very interesting variable, especially for 
administrators looking to pass their bonds, more study is needed 
since it may be a context-specific variable. 
 
Furthermore, the fourth election characteristic considered in the 
recent research has been day of the year of the election. Piele and 
Hall (1973) noted that they could find no evidence that there was 
any better time during the year to float a bond over some other 
time of year. In contrast, Bowers et al. (2010b) tested “day of the 
year” in their model, and showed that for Michigan from 1998-
2006, there was a small but significant positive relationship 
between passing a bond and having the election later in a calendar 
year. Dunne et al. (1997) demonstrated that out of 609 bond 
elections in Oklahoma between 1988 and 1992, elections were 
more likely to be held during the school year; however they did not 
test an association with election outcome. Fifth, voter turnout was 
strongly negatively related to bond passage in the Michigan model 
(Bowers, et al., 2010b), confirming Piele and Hall (1973). And 
sixth, Bowers et al. (2010b) tested the ballot number of the 
proposed bond, for the first time across the research literature on 
school bond passage, and found that bonds that were the first or 
only issue on the ballot had significantly greater chances of 
passing, in comparison to bonds that were further down the ballot, 
postulating a model of “voter fatigue” as voters appear to be less 
likely to vote for multiple bonds on the same ballot. 
 
Similar to the above literature on bonds, a concurrent line of 
research includes bonds as just one of many types of budget 
referenda that may be brought before school district voters in states 
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such as New York, Ohio and California, which may also include 
recurring and non-recurring costs and revenue requests through 
new taxes in addition to construction bonds (Berkman & Plutzer, 
2005; Ehrenberg, Ehrenberg, Smith, & Zhang, 2004; Meredith, 
2009; Shober, 2011; Silverman, 2011). In the present study, we 
focus on district bond elections, but a brief overview of the budget 
referenda literature helps to contextualize this research domain, 
focusing on the issues of refloating failed attempts and district and 
community factors.  
 
First, for the issue of refloats, in examining a dataset of 1,919 
budget referenda including California, Colorado and Minnesota 
from 2001-2005, Schober (2011) found that the total number of 
ballot measures within a district over the timespan was negative 
and significant on budget election outcome while in a study of 
4,560 New York budget referenda from 1975-1997 Ehrenberg et 
al. (2004) found that failed budgets in one year had a lower chance 
of passing in the following year. However, neither of these studies 
addressed the conditional and dependent nature of the refloat data 
as discussed above. Second, as with the school bond literature, 
district and community factors also appear to play a role in district 
budget election outcomes. Silverman (2011) examined the 
percentage of the “no” vote for 179 New York budget referenda 
from 2003-2010 and found that larger districts had lower 
percentages of no votes, while districts with higher minority 
populations and a proposed change in spending had higher 
percentages of no votes. Furthermore, Ehrenberg et al. (2004) and 
Shober (2011) showed that suburban districts had lower chances of 
passing budget referenda, while districts had higher chances of 
passing a finance ballot measure with increasing enrollment in 
magnet and charter schools, long-term school boards and higher 
percentages of minority students, students in poverty, population 
over age 65, and population with college degrees. In these ways, 
the broader district budget referenda literature provides additional 
context to help inform the more specific models of the factors most 
associated with passing capital facility finance bonds of the present 
study. 
 
Rationale of the Present Study 
While the recent research in the bond domain has helped to expand 
the earlier model proposed by Piele and Hall (1973), there are 
significant limitations to the studies. First is that the facility bond 
studies have been almost exclusively focused on Michigan while 
the budget election studies have overly focused on New York and 
California. While continued study of individual states helps to 
build and test a rich set of models, context-specific effects are 
problematic, as exemplified by the inclusion of technology in the 
bond wording, which was significant in Oklahoma but was 
unrelated to the models for Michigan bonds. In the dual effort to 
build both generalizable theory as well as widely applicable 
recommendations, there is a need in the literature to study these 
models and effects in other state contexts. Likewise, the variance 
explained across the bond election models has been relatively low, 
with the studies either not reporting an R2 statistic (Sielke, 1998; 
Zimmer & Jones, 2005), as an indication of the amount of variance 
explained by the model in the probability of passing a bond, or 
reporting variance explained in the models as low as 11.2% 
(Bowers, et al., 2010a) 12.9% (Beckham & Maiden, 2003) 17.6 % 
(Zimmer, et al., 2011), and as high as 24.6% (Bowers, et al., 
2010b). This indicates that as the models and samples have 
improved, this research literature has been able to account for an 
increasingly large amount of the variance in the probability of 
passing school facilities bonds. However, while to date explaining 
only 25% of the variance from a single state is informative, in the 
attempt to build theory and practical recommendations, further 
work is needed to refine the models and test them in other 
contexts.  
 
Second, the research domain lacks a strong theoretical model. Each 
study included above presents different overlapping sets of factors 
associated with bond passage or not, but researchers and especially 
school administrators looking for strategies to pass their bonds 
currently lack a theoretical framework from which to understand 
why and how some bonds pass while others fail. In noting this lack 
of recent theory on bond passage, while here we take the bond as 
the unit of analysis, we do not wish to discount the large body of 
work on the median voter model (Fort, 1988; Fort & Bunn, 1998), 
especially as it applies to local school bond elections. As an 
example, Ladd’s (1975) foundational work in this area 
demonstrated that “tax price” was significantly related to 
individual voter preferences for school construction debt. Ladd 
found that communities that relied more on a non-residential local 
tax base (measured as the percentage of the residential assessed 
value in the community) had stronger support for financing schools 
since it appeared that the residents off-loaded the costs onto local 
businesses (Ladd, 1975). However, our focus in the present study 
is on the bond as the unit of analysis, rather than on the median 
voter.  
 
When taking the bond as the unit of analysis, since Piele & Hall 
(1973), little work has been done to articulate a theory to 
contextualize the empirical findings across the studies. From the 
perspective of the theory postulated by Piele & Hall (1973), they 
saw three types of characteristics around factors associated with 
the probability of bond passage that differed in the amount of 
influence a district administrator could exert on that factor. First, 
community characteristics such as district locale, enrollment, and 
demographics were viewed as constants. This in-turn influenced 
overall community support attitudes and voter preferences in ways 
that the administrator has little control over. Second, bond 
characteristics, such as wording and amount, were seen as 
somewhat malleable since while administrators may have a list of 
what is needed and how much that may cost, they have at least 
partial control over exact wording and amounts. According to Piele 
& Hall (1973), they postulate that community demographics set the 
level of school support, but that bond characteristics may help 
drive overall voter participation. Third, election characteristics, 
such as the election date as well as a community’s past voting 
history and tax base may influence participation. In addition, 
administrators may have some choice over aspects of election 
characteristics, such as the election date, which could influence the 
overall outcome. Thus, overall, while dated, Piele & Hall’s theory 
provides a starting point to begin to update these models. 
 
Therefore, given the current lack of evidence demonstrating which 
factors associated with bond passage generalize across state 
contexts and multiple years of data, as well as the current lack of 
generalizable theory in the research to date, our strategy in the 
present study is to first examine which factors replicate and extend 
the findings from the past literature across state contexts using a 
direct effects model, focusing here on Texas using the longest time 
span to date, 1997-2009. We then move to re-examining the theory 
from Piele & Hall (1973), informing the model using our findings 
and the findings across the studies to date in which we postulate a 
mediated model of school bond passage, helping to inform not 
only future research, but to aid administrators as they face 
important decisions as they ask their communities for needed funds 
through local election bond proposals. 
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Consequently, the research questions for this study were: 
1) To what extent do the previous models of school district 
bond passage apply in a different but recent state context, 
namely Texas from 1997-2008? 
2) How does a model of bond passage rates from Texas 
inform both a) a theory of school district bond passage as 
well as b) recommendations for best practice to help 






This study analyzed all public school district capital facility 
finance bonds in Texas from 1997 through 2009. An analysis of 
Texas provides an interesting southern state context that has not 
previously been included in school bond election research, and due 
to the breathe of data available, also provides a unique opportunity 
to examine a large comprehensive longitudinal dataset of local 
school bond elections. Analyzing the entire population of data 
from a specific policy domain is recommended given the 
accessibility of the data, and the elimination of sample bias 
(Bowers, 2010). Additionally, the Texas context is important, in 
that unlike states such as Ohio and New York, Texas facility 
financing is similar to Michigan in that bond elections focus 
specifically on facilities, rather than including other district related 
budget items along with facilities. Thus, Texas provides an 
interesting policy domain to study, due to this similarity in facility 
finance policy across the states, along with the opportunity to 
examine bond passage rates in a large and demographically 
complex state, especially given our desire to test for the effects of 
demographics and district context on bond passage noted above. 
For a review of the differences and similarities in school finance 
policy across the states, especially as it relates to facilities 
financing, please see Sielke et al. (2001). 
 
Publically accessible data was obtained from the Texas Bond 
Review Board (TBRB, n.d.) Texas ISD Bond Database, which 
includes information about all school district finance bonds in 
Texas including the district name, county, year, election date, 
proposition number, whether or not the bond carried or was 
defeated, amount of the bond and the purpose. The district names 
and counties were cross-referenced with the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES) Common Core of Data (CCD) 
(NCES, n.d.) to obtain the unique NCES district identification 
numbers. These ID numbers were then used to merge the Texas 
bond database with yearly reported district variables in the CCD, 
including district and community characteristics such as district 
locale (city, suburb, town, rural), and district enrollment among 
others. In addition, we used the Texas school district IDs to merge 
the Texas Education Agency’s (TEA) Academic Excellence 
Indicator System (AEIS) database to include the local percent tax 
rate per district as a measure of tax burden in the school district, as 
well as the local tax price through including the percent residential 
assessed value (TEA, n.d.). Five bond proposals were excluded 
from the dataset due to incomplete or missing data. This resulted in 
a database with n=2,224 school district bond proposals covering 
the years 1997 through 2009, the largest school bond database 
analyzed to date. In addition, while NCES had not yet published 
finance data for districts for 2010 and 2011 at the time that this 
study was conducted, and thus the final statistical models had to be 
constrained to only the years 1997-2009 with complete data, the 
Texas ISD Bond Database did report bond election results through 
2011, and so we do provide some descriptive analysis of this data 
from 1997-2011, n=2,469.  
 
Variables Included in the Analysis 
We used previous theory, literature and the availability of relevant 
variables to guide our selection of variables for subsequent 
analysis. The means, standard deviations, minimum and 
maximums for variables included in the analysis are presented in 
Table 1. The dependent variable for the study was if a school 
district bond election passed or failed. The independent variables 
are separated into five categories that represent the main themes 
from the literature and were available in the public datasets. First, 
bond characteristics include float and the bond amount, in millions 
of dollars. Following and expanding upon the recommendations 
from the previous literature on multiple school district bond 
attempts (Bowers, et al., 2010a, 2010b), we examined the data and 
found that it appeared that school districts that had a bond fail, 
would “refloat” the bond for a substantively similar amount and 
purpose within 36 months of the original election. Hence, we 
defined the first attempt as a first float, the second attempt as a 
second float, and a few districts attempted a third float. In addition, 
some districts along with refloating a bond broke up a larger past 
failed bond into smaller bonds upon the second or third float. 
These were also coded as a second or third float. The purpose 
listed for each bond was coded into seven categories, building 
(reference group), renovations, debt refinance, athletics facilities, 
technology, art, and other. The other category included “no-report” 
as well as all other purposes listed in the database such as for land 
purchase and transportation among others. District locale was 
coded following the recommendations of the NCES for coding the 
reported metro-centric and urban-centric CCD locale codes into 
city, suburb, town and rural (reference group) and enrollment, in 
thousands, for each district for each year was also included. Since 
many districts propose bonds to build new facilities due to 
enrollment growth, we wished to include a measure to capture this 
variance. To include a measure of enrollment growth, we first 
calculated percentage enrollment change year-to-year. To capture a 
district’s general annual trend in enrollment over the thirteen years, 
growth/decline/neutral, we then fit a regression line to the percent 
change year to year and included the unstandardized regression 
coefficient as the average annual percentage change in 
enrollment. Community characteristic variables included two 
types. First, following past research (Ehrenberg, et al., 2004; 
Shober, 2011), year 2000 census data was included for each district 
for the percentage of the population over age 65, as well as the 
percentage of the population with a college degree (either 2-year 
or 4-year). Second, student demographic variables for each district 
for each year were included from the CCD, including percent free 
lunch, Native American, Asian, African American, and Hispanic 
students. Election characteristics included the tax rate, the 
percentage of the residential assessed value, if the election 
occurred after July 1 in the calendar year in which it was 
proposed, and the location of the bond on the ballot on election day 
as either proposition issue #2, issue #3, or issue #4 or more, with 
issue #1 and “no report” combined as the reference group. We 
included election occurred after July 1 since previous to 2006, 
districts could schedule special elections in Texas on a variety of 
dates throughout the calendar year, however since 2006 districts 
were required to hold the election in either May or November. 
Thus, to examine the past findings of time of year in the model, we 
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Table 1: Descriptives for variables included in the model 
 
Mean SD Min Max 
     
Bond Election Passed (dependent variable) 0.77 0.42 0 1 
Bond Characteristics     
First Float 0.90 0.30 0 1 
Second Float 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Third Float 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Bond Amount (in millions) 38.07 90.69 0.10 1366.30 
Bond Wording       
Renovations 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Debt Refinance 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Athletics 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Technology 0.02 0.12 0 1 
Art 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Other 0.29 0.45 0 1 
District Characteristics       
City 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Suburb 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Town 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Enrollment (in thousands) 7.53 15.50 0.04 210.99 
% Average Annual Change in Enrollment 0.18 0.37 -6.39 1.83 
Community Characteristics       
% Population over age 65 11.96 5.01 2.27 31.98 
% Population with a college degree 14.81 8.18 1.86 92.93 
% Free lunch students 34.02 17.87 0 95.73 
% Native American students 0.40 0.82 0 26.39 
% Asian Students 1.27 2.47 0 24.58 
% African American students 9.09 12.44 0 86.07 
% Hispanic students 31.03 27.68 0 99.91 
Election Characteristics       
Tax Rate 1.49 0.17 0.70 2.00 
% Residential Assessed Value 42.91 21.01 0 94.40 
Election occurs after July 1 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Bond is issue #2 on ballot 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Bond is issue #3 on ballot 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Bond is issue #4 or more on ballot 0.03 0.17 0 1 




Following the recommendations of the previous literature on 
modeling the conditional nature of the data on bond floats and 
refloats (Bowers, et al., 2010a, 2010b) we used discrete-time 
hazard modeling (Singer & Willett, 2003) to estimate the 
probability of a bond passing or failing in Texas between 1997-
2009. The data are conditional because a bond is not eligible to be 
a refloat unless it has failed on the previous attempt, and no bonds 
that passed on the first attempt can be second floats. For a review 
of conditional dataset analysis and discrete-time hazard modeling 
see Singer and Willet (2003). Briefly, we constructed the dataset as 
a unit-period dataset, such that rather than list each district once, 
the bond was considered the unit of analysis, so each row of the 
dataset represents each attempt of a bond. This allows the 
probability of passing the bond to be appropriately estimated given 
the conditional nature of the data, such that each float is considered  
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Table 2: Texas school district bonds 1997-2009, by bond wording, district locale and floats. 
 First Float  Second Float  Third Float  All Floats  
 Total % Pass  Total % Pass  Total % Pass  Total % Pass  
Bond Wording             
Buildings 1161 78.21  123 74.80  14 57.14  1298 77.66  
Renovations 236 81.78  23 78.26  3 100.00  262 81.68  
Debt Refinance 60 81.67  4 100.00  25 44.00  64 82.81  
Athletics 124 62.90  19 63.16  3 33.33  146 62.33  
Technology 32 84.38  3 66.67  25 44.00  35 82.86  
Art 17 58.82  1 100.00  25 44.00  18 61.11  
Other 572 81.64  45 68.89  6 ---  623 79.94  
District Locale             
City 279 79.21  22 72.73  1 100.00  302 78.81  
Suburb 567 80.25  50 80.00  14 35.71  631 79.24  
Town 325 73.23  39 64.10  3 33.33  367 71.93  
Rural 828 78.50  89 71.91  7 57.14  924 77.71  
All Bonds 1999 78.24  200 72.50  25 44.00  2224 77.34  
Note: Bond wording categories can sum to greater than 100% due to overlapping categories 
a pseudo-intercept in a logistic regression equation, taking the 
general form of: 
 
 
In which, the dependent variable is modeled as the logit of passing 
a bond, the three pseudo-intercepts are represented for each float 
by a separate alpha, then each predictor is included with its own 
beta as in a regular logistic or multiple regression. Because logit 
regression coefficients are inherently difficult to interpret, we 
converted significant coefficients into odds (e^(logit)) as 
recommend (Borooah, 2002; Singer & Willett, 2003). 
 
RESULTS 
In comparison to school bond passage rates in the other recent 
studies discussed above, the Texas bond passage rate from 1997-
2009 was high, at 77% (see Table 1), indicating that over this 
thirteen-year time-span the more likely outcome has been bond 
passage. However, the purpose of this study is to assess the extent 
to which specific variables nominated in past research in other 
states are associated with bond passage rates in Texas, controlling 
for other variables in the model, to inform both theory and 
practice. Table 2 disaggregates the frequencies for school district 
bond passage rates by float, bond wording and district locale for 
n=2,224 bonds. As discussed in the methods, a first float is defined 
as the first attempt by a district to pass a bond, where the second 
and third float is defined as “refloating” substantially similar bonds 
if the first attempt failed. For Texas from 1997-2009, 90% of the 
bonds were first floats with 78.24% passing, 9% were second 
floats with 72.50% passing, and 0.11% were third floats with 
44.00% passing (Table 2, bottom row). In addition, there appear to 
be interesting differences when examining bond pass rates by the 
wording of the purpose of the bond as well as district locale (Table 
2, far right column). Bonds requesting school facility renovations 
or refinancing of district debt appear to pass more often than other 
types of bonds, while bonds for athletics (such as stadiums and 
fields) or art (such as performance halls or auditoriums) pass much 
less often than their counterparts. Interestingly though, all passage 
rates were over 50%. Examining bond passage rates by district 
locale, as opposed to the Michigan studies, while towns had 
somewhat lower passage rates than other districts, all districts 
passed about three-quarters of their bonds. Also, as a departure 
from past studies, when disaggregating the data by float and 
wording or locale, there appeared to be few differences that were 
not reflected in the total numbers. However, while descriptives 
such as those presented in Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of 
the data, we turn next to the question of which variables are 
significant in an overall model of bond passage in Texas when 
controlling for the other variables of interest. 
 
As noted in the methods, we used discrete-time hazard modeling to 
model the probability of passing a school district bond in Texas 
from 1997-2009. The baseline hazard model including only first 
float, second float and third float, is akin to an empty or 
unconditional model, and indicated a significant and decreasing 
probability of passing a bond on multiple attempts with decreasing 
odds ratios for first, second and third floats of 3.595, 2.636, and 
0.786 respectively, with logit coefficients of 1.280, 0.969, and -
0.241. Much like in multiple and hierarchical linear regression, 
where the unconditional intercept (constant) represents the mean 
outcome for the entire sample, here the baseline hazard model 
represents the overall probability at each time point (float) of 
passing the bond, such that converting the baseline coefficients 
into fitted hazard probabilities (1/(1+e^(-logit))) equals 0.782, 
0.725 and 0.440 for the first, second and third floats, which match 
exactly to the basic frequencies reported for the pass rates in the 
bottom row of Table 2. This demonstrates the effect size of the 
decrease in the probability of passing a bond when it is refloated, 
in that the decrease experienced between first and second floats 
was only 5.7%, while there was a 34.2% difference in passage 
probability between first and third floats in the unconditional 
model. The fit statistics for the baseline hazard model -2 log 
likelihood equaled 2363.975 with pseudo R2 of 0.276 for the Cox 
and Snell estimate and 0.368 for Nagelkerke. Because there is no 
direct method to calculate the variance explained in a logistic 
regression (Borooah, 2002), providing two estimates of the 
variance explained, one conservative and one liberal, is 
recommended. Here, the variance explained estimates indicate that 
the unconditional model alone accounts for about 30% of the 
variance in bond passage rates in Texas. 
 
Table 3 presents a step-wise discrete-time hazard model estimating 
the probability of passing a school district bond election in Texas  
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Table 3: Logistic regression model estimation of passing a Texas school district capital facilities finance 
bond, 1997-2009. 



















Bond Characteristics               
First Float 1.173 *** 0.117 3.232  1.598 ** 0.603 4.945  2.344 ** 0.760 10.425 
Second Float 0.897 *** 0.190 2.453  1.426 * 0.627 4.160  2.205 ** 0.773 9.067 
Third Float -0.324  0.422   0.274  0.748   0.910  0.886  
Bond amount (in millions $)a 0.027  0.035   -0.241 *** 0.065 0.786  -0.245 *** 0.069 0.783 
Renovations 0.305  0.173   0.335 ~ 0.178 1.398  0.497 ** 0.184 1.644 
Debt Refinance 0.410  0.345   0.494  0.367   0.633 ~ 0.371 1.883 
Athletics -0.671 *** 0.188 0.511  -0.362 ~ 0.213 0.696  -0.326  0.219  
Technology 0.286  0.454   0.373  0.473   0.553  0.479  
Art -0.753  0.490   -0.285  0.520   -0.338  0.531  
Other 0.189  0.124   0.160  0.139   -0.203  0.219  
District & Community Characteristics               
City      0.029  0.247   -0.006  0.254  
Suburb      0.048  0.168   -0.039  0.174  
Town      -0.157  0.168   -0.194  0.171  
Enrollment (in thousands)a      0.019  0.090   -0.050  0.093  
% Avg. change annual enrollment      0.440 * 0.191 1.552  0.497 * 0.194 1.643 
% Pop over age 65      -0.041 ** 0.015 0.960  -0.044 ** 0.015 0.957 
% Pop with a college degree      0.004  0.009   0.003  0.010  
% Free lunch students      0.001  0.005   0.001  0.005  
% Native American students      -0.081  0.059   -0.091  0.058  
% Asian students      0.120 ** 0.038 1.127  0.127 *** 0.039 1.135 
% African American students      -0.003  0.005   -0.003  0.006  
% Hispanic students      0.008 ** 0.003 1.008  0.008 ** 0.003 1.008 
Election Characteristics               
% Tax rate      0.341  0.328   -0.432  0.511  
% Residential assessed value      -0.003  0.004   -0.003  0.004  
Election after July 1      0.116  0.110   0.117  0.113  
Proposition #2      -0.907 *** 0.184 0.404  -0.880 *** 0.189 0.415 
Proposition #3      -1.178 *** 0.251 0.308  -1.132 *** 0.259 0.322 
Proposition #4 or greater      -1.786 *** 0.317 0.168  -1.743 *** 0.328 0.175 
Election Year (ref. 2009)               
1997           0.827 * 0.379 2.286 
1998           0.761 ~ 0.402 2.140 
1999           1.194 ** 0.409 3.300 
2000           0.494  0.348  
2001           0.847 * 0.365 2.333 
2002           0.260  0.347  
2003           0.139  0.358  
2004           0.443  0.366  
2005           0.225  0.370  
2006           0.601 ~ 0.364  
2007           1.063 ** 0.339 2.895 
2008           -0.134  0.303  
Goodness-of-fit               
-2 Log Likelihood 2337.842     2222.768    2185.338   
Cox and Snell R2 0.285     0.321    0.332   
Nagelkerke R2 0.380     0.428    0.443   
~p≤0.01,*p≤0.05, **p≤0.01, ***p≤0.001; a indicates the variable was natural log transformed  
 
between 1997 and 2009 (see methods). While logistic regression is 
robust under non-normal data conditions (Borooah, 2002) the 
variables bond amount and enrollment were natural log 
transformed as recommended in such cases to correct for extreme 
skewness in the data which helps to provide more accurate 
parameter estimates and standard errors. Model A examines the 
effects of bond characteristics on the outcome of the probability of 
passing a bond, and includes float as well as bond amount and 
bond wording. Model A accounts for about one third of the 
variance in the likelihood of passing a bond. Model B adds district 
and community characteristics as well as election characteristics to 
the model, explaining between 32.1% and 42.8% of the variance in 
the probability of passing a bond. Model C adds each of the years 
from 1997 to 2009 to control for variance in year-to-year 
fluctuations of community support for school bond elections, with 
2009 as the reference group (see Table 3). 
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Table 4: Texas facilities bond percent pass and mean, standard deviation, sum, minimum and maximum 
for bond amounts per year (in millions of $). 
 
Number % Pass Mean SD Sum Min Max 
1997 218 81.65 15.618 38.389 3,404.825 0.125 483.475 
1998 126 78.57 33.260 76.276 4,190.820 0.355 678.000 
1999 180 86.67 29.168 55.250 5,250.275 0.230 398.000 
2000 166 78.31 27.564 60.483 4,575.645 0.500 398.000 
2001 163 81.59 30.052 70.152 4,898.462 0.325 495.000 
2002 184 72.28 40.685 128.900 7,486.056 0.173 1,366.295 
2003 161 70.19 37.514 79.385 6,039.771 0.100 478.000 
2004 175 77.14 
43.394 80.221 7,593.878 0.300 659.100 
2005 149 73.15 
40.926 63.600 6,097.967 0.240 399.000 
2006 207 77.78 38.020 75.374 7,870.213 0.175 798.000 
2007 233 81.97 62.974 137.100 14,673.025 0.500 807.000 
2008 168 67.86 60.295 143.800 10,129.577 0.400 1,350.000 
2009 95 70.53 25.959 36.687 2,466.065 0.230 197.500 
2010 131 48.85 34.973 78.527 4,581.413 0.620 535.142 
2011 108 64.81 36.605 66.492 3,953.308 0.310 399.410 
Totals 2,469 75.25 37.829 89.101 93,211.301 0.100 1,366.295 
 
As the final full model in Table 3, Model C explains between 
33.2% and 44.3% of the variance in the likelihood of passing a 
school bond election in Texas between 1997 and 2009. This is the 
largest reported variance explained to date in this research domain. 
Significant parameter estimates in the model include first and 
second float, with third float non-significant most likely due to the 
low proportion of bonds that were third floats, which is in turn 
most likely due to the overall high probability of all bonds passing, 
leaving few to persist to third float in Texas. For bond 
characteristics, bond amount was negative and significant in the 
model, and we show for the first time in the recent school bond 
research that bonds including wording for renovations and debt 
refinancing were significantly more likely to pass, controlling for 
the other variables in the model. Interestingly, while athletics was 
significantly negative in Model A, upon inclusion of district and 
community as well as election characteristics, the fact that athletics 
is no longer significant in Models B and C indicates that these 
models now explain that variance. In testing an intermediate model 
which did not include election characteristics, athletics was still 
significant and negative (data not shown), suggesting that it is the 
election characteristics that are explaining the variance in the 
negative effect of athletics on bond passage rates. Interestingly, for 
district and community characteristics, district locale was not 
significant in the final full model, nor was enrollment, percentage 
of population with a college degree, or percent free lunch students, 
which differs from the findings from Michigan. Average 
percentage annual change in enrollment was positive and 
significant, which most likely reflects that many districts in Texas 
request new facilities due to enrollment growth. However, percent 
population age 65 or over was strongly negatively significant 
controlling for the other variables in the model. Furthermore, for 
the first time in the recent literature, percent of students from 
different ethnic groups was tested in the model as a proxy for the 
community demographics, and indicated percentage of Asian and 
Hispanic students had a significant and positive relationship with 
passing a school bond.  
 
For election characteristics, only the proposition number was 
significant and strongly negative in the final models. As an 
indication of the position on the ballot, each successive lower 
placement down the ballot experienced increased negative odds of 
passage, with bonds that were in position four or lower being 5.71 
times less likely to pass than bonds that were in the reference 
group (converting odds of passing into odds of not passing to 
interpret an odds ratio less than 1.0 gives odds-1=0.175-1=5.71) 
controlling for the other variables in the model (see Table 3). 
Additionally, Model C includes year, controlling for the variance 
in passage rates due to yearly exogenous fluctuations in 
community bond election preferences. In comparison to 2009 as 
the reference group, all years analyzed had higher likelihoods of 
having a bond passed except for 2008, with 1997-1999, and 2001 
and 2007 significantly higher. 
 
While the models described here only include data from 1997 to 
2009, due to the need for complete data across the district and 
community variables (see methods), the state of Texas did report 
the outcomes for bonds in 2009-2011. Table 4 presents descriptive 
statistics for the entire available fifteen year dataset, including per 
year the number of bonds proposed, passage rates, mean amount in 
millions of dollars, standard deviation, total amount of bond 
requests per year, and the minimum and maximum each year. 
Examining Table 4 reveals that bond passage rates for the state 
fluctuated between 70.19% as a low in 2003 and 86.67% as a high 
in 1999 until 2008, in which passage rates dipped below 70% for 
the first time in the dataset. The 2008 decline coincides with the 
onset of the 2008 U.S. nation-wide recession, which has been 
widely reported as the worst U.S. economic down-turn since the 
great depression in the 1930s (Temin, 2010), and corresponds to 
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the tightening of the municipal bond debt market at the time. 
Indeed, the subsequent years of 2009-2011 appear to have been a 
radically different context in which to attempt to pass a bond, with 
overall numbers of bonds proposed in 2009 at only 95, 40.7% of 
the high of 233 proposed bonds just two years earlier in 2007 (see 
Table 4). In addition, overall bond amounts drastically declined, 
and for the first time in the dataset in 2010, less than two-thirds of 
the bonds in the state passed, with the passage rate dipping below 
50%, and only 64.81% of bonds passing in 2011. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to examine the factors most 
associated with passing or failing school district bond elections in 
Texas. The Texas model provides a useful comparison to the past 
literature as well as a comparison to the more recent research 
including Michigan and Oklahoma. We divide the following 
discussion into three sections. First, we discuss the results as they 
relate to informing the theory around school bond elections. 
Second we discuss the limitations of the study, and then we 
conclude with specific recommendations aimed at informing 
school district administrator practice with recommendations that 
generalize across state contexts as well as what may be more 
specific for Texas. 
 
Past models of bond passage put forward by Piele and Hall (1973) 
indicated that there are two broad and competing effects on the 
likelihood of passing a bond. First is the overall community 
support for voting for new taxes to support school construction and 
construction debt financing. According to the theory, community 
support is mostly constant on yearly timescales, changing only at a 
more glacial pace as demographics change over generations. This 
is predicted since the majority of voter behavior is highly related to 
community demographics, such as the age, education and SES of 
the local population. Consequently, each community appears to 
have a consistent fraction of “yes” voters, and according to Piele 
and Hall (1973), bond elections seem to turn on getting these 
voters to the polls, especially in communities in which overall 
support for school bond elections is weak. The second effect which 
competes with the first however is that while the administration 
has quite a bit of control over election timing, bond size and 
wording, according to Piele and Hall (1973), almost none of these 
aspects of the bonds in their studies were significantly related to 
passage, with the overall community preferences dominating the 
past models. However, the more recent work reviewed above takes 
the bond as the unit of analysis, and analyzes much larger and 
complete state-wide datasets over multiple years using more 
appropriate statistics, methods and samples that were not available 
in the 1970s. This more recent work has identified bond and 
election characteristics that can be tailored by the school 
administration, that while the district must acknowledge the old 
adage that “all politics is local” (Berkman & Plutzer, 2005; Price, 
1932), and that they may have a consistent fraction of yes voters, 
there are specific aspects of a bond that appear to be favored over 
others. In our model, this included the community characteristics 
as well as bond and election characteristics.  
 
In the following section, we discuss our findings as they relate to 
this issue of studying the bond as the unit of analysis and this 
difference between community characteristics that are outside the 
influence of district administrators versus bond and election 
characteristics that appear to be malleable by the district and thus 
can vary over time and impact the probability of a bond passing. 
After discussing each of the main types of community, bond and 
election characteristics, we then offer a combined framework to 
help guide future research and theory building through a possible 




In the present study, we found that controlling for the other 
variables in the model, district locale as well as enrollment was not 
significantly associated with the probability of passing a school 
bond, but that growth in enrollment was positive and significant. 
While district size, as measured by enrollment, has been shown 
previously to not be related to bond passage rates (Bowers, et al., 
2010b; Piele & Hall, 1973; Zimmer, et al., 2011) and so the non-
significant finding here is consistent with the past research, the 
non-significance of district locale was unexpected given the past 
research from Michigan that showed that small towns and rural 
districts are at an increased disadvantage in attempting to pass a 
bond (Bowers, et al., 2010a, 2010b; Zimmer, et al., 2011; Zimmer 
& Jones, 2005). Our findings here suggest that district locale may 
be context specific, and that it may matter more in states such as 
Michigan than in states such as Texas. We encourage future 
research to continue to explore this issue. 
 
Furthermore, we found that controlling for the other variables in 
the model, the percent of the population over age 65 was negative 
and significant on the probability of passing a bond, while the 
percentage of the population with a college degree and the 
percentage of free lunch students were not significant in the model. 
The negative finding of percentage of the population over age 65 is 
consistent with previous literature, in that not only can the senior 
citizen population be active in voting in most communities, but 
that they are traditionally seen as relatively unsupportive of new 
school debt (Button & Rosenbaum, 1989; Duncombe, et al., 2003; 
Piele & Hall, 1973), due in part to decreased incomes brought on 
by retirement as well as not having children currently enrolled in 
the local schools. However, recent work in the broader school 
budget referenda literature suggests that population over age 65 is 
positive on school finance measures in New York (Ehrenberg, et 
al., 2004), Florida (Duncombe, et al., 2003), California, Colorado 
and Minnesota (Shober, 2011), and thus the traditional idea of the 
retiree as unsupportive of increased school taxes may be suspect 
(Berkman & Plutzer, 2005). Our findings suggest either a context 
effect specific for Texas or a difference between favoring 
increased school revenue but perhaps not facilities. 
 
In contrast with our finding on percent of population over age 65, 
percent of the population with a college degree and percent of free 
lunch students, as a proxy for the relative poverty in the 
community, were not significant. Poverty and education in a 
community as measured similar to the present study as well as with 
median income and percent in poverty, have been shown 
previously to be significantly related to bond passage rates 
(Bowers, et al., 2010b; Piele & Hall, 1973; Zimmer, et al., 2011), 
however in Texas, controlling for the other variables in the model, 
these variables do not appear to be as important. However, as with 
percentage population over age 65, the percentage of the 
population with a college degree is based on the data available for 
each district in the NCES Common Core of Data (CCD), the 2000 
U.S. census data. These variables are changing over time, but we 
were limited to modeling them as time invariant due to the 
decennial data collection cycle in the U.S. In addition, while 
percent free lunch students varies with time in the model, percent 
free and reduced lunch would have been a more acceptable 
variable to model, however it was unavailable for 1997 and 1998 
data in the CCD, so to include those two years of data we used 
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percent free lunch as a reasonable proxy. Future research should 
work to include broader measures of community education and 
poverty in Texas to increase the accuracy of the model. 
 
This study is the first in the more recent research to model the 
percentage of students from different ethnic groups attending the 
school district on the probability of passing a bond. According to 
Piele and Hall (1973), whites, while more likely to turnout for an 
election, were less likely to vote for school bonds, whereas non-
whites were more likely to vote in favor, as is also the finding from 
the broader school budget referenda literature (Ehrenberg, et al., 
2004; Shober, 2011; Silverman, 2011). Here, we’ve replicated 
those findings in which higher proportions of Asian and Hispanic 
students corresponded to an increased likelihood of passing a bond, 
all else being equal. For Texas, this is an especially relevant 
finding given the large and growing Hispanic population, and that 
many cities in Texas have a majority of students who are Hispanic 
(Guzmán, 2001). Our model suggests that in Texas, the relatively 
rapidly shifting demographics present an opportunity for school 
districts, in that in comparison to communities which have stable 
demographics; these shifting demographics could be providing 
Texas districts an increase in the “yes” voter fraction of their 
communities. In addition, we postulate that the large and growing 
Hispanic population may contribute to the overall high rates of 
bond passage experienced in Texas. Future research should 
examine cross-state comparisons to address this issue. 
Furthermore, following recent research on education and the 
demographic changes in the U.S., especially in the south and 
southwest (Glass, 2008), we hypothesize that there may be a rising 
tension in Texas, as demonstrated by the dual results of the 
negative effect of older voters versus the positive effect of 
increased proportions of non-white students in schools which are 
both growing in Texas and may have opposite preferences for 
school bond issues. Future research should examine this issue as it 
may become more pronounced over time. While the recent 2009-
2011 decline in bond amounts and passage rates in Texas are most 
likely explained by the recession, conflated with this are these 
significant demographic changes which may be impacting the 
traditionally strong support in Texas for school bonds.  
 
Bond Characteristics 
Our findings indicate that important bond characteristics include 
float, amount of the bond, and the bond purpose being related to 
renovations or debt refinancing, controlling for the other variables 
in the model. The point that refloats of bonds appear to have lower 
chances of success, replicates the recent findings from Michigan 
(Bowers, et al., 2010a, 2010b), indicating that the first float has the 
best chances of passing. In addition, few studies of school bond 
passage have analyzed the purpose of the bonds. We found that 
bonds requesting renovations were 1.644 times more likely to pass 
than bonds not requesting renovations, and bonds requesting 
refinancing were 1.883 times more likely to pass. For renovations, 
it may be that voters are more willing to pay for “upgrades” to 
facilities in comparison to other options; while for refinancing, 
districts usually promote the bond as “no new increase in taxes” as 
they refinance their existing debt for more years. What is usually 
not mentioned in these instances is that if the bond were to fail, 
that there would be a subsequent decrease in taxes. It may be that 
this strategy works, or equally plausible, Texas voters may support 
a “neutral” taxation policy, in which new taxes are not favored, but 
extending current taxes is seen as an acceptable way to fund 
needed facilities. 
 
Interestingly, bond amount was significant in our model. On the 
surface, intuition suggests that voters may have “sticker shock”, or 
at the least, large bonds indicate a large increase in taxes, which 
might be seen as a negative. The research from Michigan supports 
this point (Bowers, et al., 2010b), and we have replicated it here 
with Texas data. However, bond amount was not a significant 
predictor in the Oklahoma study (Beckham & Maiden, 2003) and 
had mixed results in Piele and Hall (1973). This may indicate, all 
other variables being equal, that influence of bond amount on bond 
election outcomes may be state context specific. In addition, this 
point may be equally true for the other types of purposes for the 
bond, including technology, which was significant in Oklahoma 
(Beckham & Maiden, 2003), but not in the present study for Texas. 
Our future research will work to further explore this issue. 
 
Election Characteristics 
An interesting recent finding from Michigan was that district long-
term debt was significantly related to increasing rates of bond 
passage (Bowers, et al., 2010b; Zimmer, et al., 2011; Zimmer & 
Jones, 2005) as was election day of the year and proposition 
number (Bowers, et al., 2010b), however previous research showed 
that district local property tax revenue was not significantly related 
to bond passage rates (Sielke, 1998). We tested similar models for 
the Texas data and found that the local tax rate (as a measure of the 
local tax burden), or if the election was in the second half of the 
year were each not significantly related to the likelihood of bond 
passage. It may be that the generally high rates of bond passage in 
Texas during this time swamp out the effect of property taxes and 
timing, since the vast majority of bonds pass. In addition, the 
variable percent residential assessed value, as a measure capturing 
the local tax price, was not significantly related to bond passage, 
further indicating that the bond as the unit of analysis diverges 
from the traditional median voter model of election behavior. 
Future research should continue to include these variables as 
predictors, since it appears that they may be context specific. 
 
In contrast, in replication of the Michigan research (Bowers, et al., 
2010b), proposition number was strongly negatively significant on 
the likelihood of passing a bond. Bond proposals that were the 
second, third, fourth or lower on the ballot were significantly less 
likely to pass, controlling for the other variables in the model. This 
finding supports the previous hypothesis of “voter fatigue”, in that 
voters are more likely to vote for a school bond when it is at the 
top of the ballot, but that successive ballot measures are rejected at 
successively higher rates. 
 
A Proposed Mediated Model of School Bond Passage 
Here, to summarize our findings above in relation to the past 
research, and to provide a framework for future research to test a 
more comprehensive model of bond passage, we turn next to 
offering a proposed mediated model in an SEM framework. Our 
goal is to encourage future work in this area that addresses a more 
comprehensive mediated theory of facility bond passage. As with 
all of the other recent studies on school bond passage, we analyzed 
a direct effects model. While we argue here that our model is the 
most comprehensive to date, explaining the largest amount of 
variance in bond passage in the recent studies, we acknowledge 
that a direct effects model is insufficient to fully delineate a 
contemporary theory of school bond passage. This is because few 
of the variables included in any of the recent models have a direct 
impact on balloting at the polls, but rather must act through the 
communal action of a community as it either supports school 
bonds or not, which in turn most likely influences participation in 
elections, which then results in specific voters with a specific  
12 
 
Bowers & Lee (2013) 
 
 
Figure 1: Proposed alternative mediated model of school bond passage 
preference for the bond showing up on election day and actually 
voting. In combining our results here from our direct effects model 
with those of the past literature, as well as the theory proposed by 
Piele and Hall (1973), our results point to a new mediated model of 
school bond passage, which we propose here (see Figure 1).  
 
Reading Figure 1 from left to right, we propose an expanded 
mediated model that could be tested through adapting a structural 
equation modeling framework to what is now known about these 
variables and how they may interact. As discussed above, Piele and 
Hall (1973) noted that in the studies they reviewed it appeared that 
most of the variables that were significantly associated with school 
bond passage or failure were constant across a community, such as 
aspects of the district and community, and that these local 
characteristics directly influenced both the overall community 
school support attitudes as well as participation in school bond 
elections (Figure 1, top left). Conversely, the recent direct effects 
models, including the results reported here, indicate that there are 
significant malleable factors in a bond election that are under the 
control of school district administrators, including bond and 
election specific variables, such as bond size, wording, and the 
position of the bond on the ballot (Figure 1, bottom left). 
Synthesizing both the past and recent research, it appears that 
while district and community characteristics may consistently 
influence school support attitudes and participation, and that 
community-wide school support attitudes remain mostly constant 
and beyond the influence of school administrators, the varying 
aspects of bond and election characteristics may directly influence 
participation and voter preferences, which then, through voter 
preferences, act on the election outcome. One can also imagine 
specific election characteristics directly impacting participation 
and election outcomes, such as the time of year of the election 
(Dunne et al., 1997; Fort and Bunn, 1998; Meredith, 2009), which 
can increase or decrease participation due to the election being 
held in conjunction with other state or national elections, or a 
higher likelihood of inclement weather on election day, such as 
during the winter in northern states, hampering the community’s 
ability to get to the polls.  
 
In addition, while the present study only provides evidence for the 
direct effects model, we hypothesize that school support attitudes 
are correlated with participation rates and that these together may 
converge in voter preference which may act on the election 
outcome. And finally, our work on modeling districts refloating 
failed bonds indicates that any broader theory should consider that 
each past election outcome in a community is remembered, and 
may influence the next election cycle not only through voter 
preference, but also through school support attitudes and 
participation and could influence administrators to change different 
aspects of the bond based on if the previous bond passed or failed. 
While we were unable to test such a mediated model here, due to 
the lack of both voter participation data and community school 
support attitudes, we propose this mediated model to help inform 
future theory, to encourage future studies to collect and analyze 
these important hypothesized mediating variables, and to help 
further define a contemporary theory of school bond passage. 
 
Limitations 
While we argue that the results of this study are robust, the 
analysis was limited in the following ways. First, the study is 
limited to the Texas context and the data available. While using the 
entire population of proposed bonds over a multi-year time span 
decreases sample bias and error in the population estimates, the 
study should still be considered a biased and intact sample, since 
we wish to generalize outside of Texas to the likelihood of passing 
a school bond in other states. Thus, controlled statistical models of 
cross-state comparisons are needed in this research domain to 
understand which parameters are context specific and which are 
more generalizable across the U.S. education system. In addition, 
other substantive variables that may influence the election 
outcome, such as the number of public information meetings held 
in the district prior to the election, as well as voter turnout and 
school support attitudes, were not available but could add 
substantially to the model. Second, we included two variables from 
the 2000 U.S. census, percentage population over age 65 and 
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reported in the CCD. Thus they were both included in the model as 
time invariant, when in fact both variables are changing over time. 
Future research should work to include the 2010 census, as well as 
estimates of these changing variables by year. Third, for the 1997 
and 1998 bond data reported by Texas, some proposition numbers 
and purpose statements were reported as “no-report”. After 1998 
there was complete data. We chose to include both years to 
increase the power of the analysis which is recommended under 
these types of conditions (Graham, Cumsille, & Elvira, 2003), and 
we addressed the issue by placing the “no-report” for proposition 
number in the reference group and in the “other” category for the 
purpose statements. Thus, both the bond characteristics and 
proposition number findings from the final full model should be 
interpreted with some caution, since the parameter estimates are 
both most likely somewhat upwardly biased. However, when we 
re-analyzed the final model excluding years 1997 and 1998 we 
found no substantive differences (data not shown). Fourth, 
variables such as median income and district long-term debt were 
available but were not included in the final model due to multi-
colinearity, mostly with percent free lunch students, tax rate and 
enrollment growth. We argue that percent free lunch students is a 
reasonable proxy of district wealth that is also measured through 
median income. The tax rate and long-term debt of the district 
were correlated, so we selected the tax rate as the broader measure 
of the local tax burden within the district. 
 
The final two main limitations deal with the statistical model, 
namely limited dependency and unobserved heterogeneity. The 
sample is somewhat dependent, in that if a bond failed on the first 
attempt, it was eligible to not only be refloated a second or third 
time if a district wished to attempt the bond again, but some 
districts broke refloated bonds into a set of smaller bonds that 
substantively added up to the original. This creates a limited 
amount of dependency within the data, with a few bonds nested 
within the broken-up structure. We considered using a two-level 
nested discrete time hazard model, however because first float has 
a one to one ratio (no level 1 variance) for such a model applied to 
this data, we determined that such a model would not be 
appropriate because it would most likely be unidentified due to this 
data structure issue. Future research should consider analyzing two 
separate models to gain a greater understanding of how breaking 
up the bonds may influence float. We argue that such a model is 
beyond the scope of the current study since we were focused on 
extending the past models into the Texas context. However, we did 
test “break-up” as a categorical dichotomous variable in the final 
model, and it was not significant (data not shown), most likely due 
to the fact that upon second float 73.08% of the non-broken up 
bonds passed while 73.81% of the broken up bonds passed. We 
encourage future research to examine this issue. 
 
The final limitation deals with unobserved heterogeneity. In hazard 
models, such as the present study, in which the probability of the 
outcome declines over the time metric, unobserved heterogeneity 
becomes an issue as an explanation for why the decline is 
occurring, in that it may be that differences in the composition of 
the risk set change over time due to unobserved subgroups (Singer 
& Willett, 2003). Here, the conditional time metric modeled is 
float and refloat of a bond, and the “hazard” of it passing decreases 
over time. However, we argue that this is less of an issue with this 
model, since it is understood that there may be “types” of bonds 
that are more likely to pass upon first float, versus second and 
third. Here we have attempted to include all of the variables 
nominated in the literature on predicting passing rates, to help 
model both float and bond passage. Our purpose was in part to 
identify if, in Texas, floating and refloat is significant, as it was in 
Michigan, which is what we were able to demonstrate. If there are 
unobserved subgroups, this does not negate the point that float is 
significant and negative in the model. We leave it to future 
research to explore additional variables that may reveal specific 
unobserved types of floated and refloated bonds that would explain 
the float significance. In addition, we acknowledge that the vast 
majority of bonds were first float only (90%), and so to test the 
robustness of the final discrete-time hazard model results when 
examining only first floats, we analyzed a first float only logistic 
regression model without the discrete-time hazard component and 
found no substantive differences in the results of the final model 
(data not shown). 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations for Practice 
In conclusion, we wish to offer practical advice to the large 
number of school district administrators working to find ways to 
fund much needed construction and renovations across schools in 
the U.S. While the direct effect of the influence of facilities on 
student achievement has been debated for some time, it is well 
known that there are specific minimum requirements of heating, 
lighting, safe and secure schools for adequate education (Bowers & 
Urick, 2011; Earthman, 2000; Earthman & Lemasters, 2009; Picus, 
Marion, Calvo, & Glenn, 2005; Roberts, 2009; Uline & 
Tschannen-Moran, 2008; Uline, Tschannen-Moran, & Wosley, 
2009). Coupled with this, there are well known and documented 
unmet capital facilities needs across the nation (Crampton, 2003), 
with a large percentage of school districts in need of renovations or 
new school facility construction. Given these priorities, we offer 
the following five recommendations for administrators. First, our 
model here confirmed the prior literature that refloated bonds have 
increasingly poor chances of passage. Thus, the first attempt is the 
most important, and so a district should devote the needed 
resources to help ensure that the bond will pass on the first attempt. 
Second, for Texas, like Oklahoma and Michigan, bond wording 
appears to be important. For Texas bonds, proposing renovations 
and debt refinancing appear to be successful strategies for passing 
a bond. As a caution, while specific requests for athletics and art 
facilities were not significant in the final model, the preliminary 
models and descriptive statistics indicate that by themselves, these 
two types of requests are favored less than others at the polls and 
we would caution against districts putting these two types of 
requests as individual and separate ballot measures. Third, we 
replicated and extended the ballot proposition number finding 
across states. Our findings strongly suggest that school bonds 
lower down on the ballot have much lower odds of passing. 
Together, these findings indicate that omnibus single ballot 
measures that include all of the needs of the district and includes 
renovations, that are at the top of the ballot (or are the only issue 
on the ballot), and are the first float, are the most likely to pass. For 
Texas, interesting times appear to be ahead, as what has been seen 
in the past research on bond passage as a constant – the percentage 
of voters who will vote yes – may be shifting as the demographics 
of the state change. However, these demographics are changing in 
opposing ways, as the percentage of older and retirement age 
citizens increases, while the percentage of non-white families and 
students is also increasing. In addition, the effects of the most 
recent recession are obvious in the most recent data, but it is 
difficult to predict how tastes for community self taxation in 
support of school facilities may change in the coming years, 
especially with the changing demographics.  
 
While we were unable to include voter turnout in the Texas 
models, past research indicates that attempts to increase general 
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voter participation and “get out the vote” efforts ends up 
decreasing the likelihood of passing a bond (Bauscher, 1993; Fort 
& Bunn, 1998; Meredith, 2009; Silverman, 2011). Piele and Hall 
(1973) noted this issue, and that it provides a conundrum for the 
U.S. school administrator, given the general democratic ideal of 
voter participation. They gave five possible options for the 
administrator faced with this situation, in which only the third 
appeared tenable in that school administrators could: 
 
1) attempt to increase general participation, assuming the 
larger voting pool will be more favorable; 2) attempt to 
discourage participation, assuming the smaller group of 
participants will be more favorable; 3) attempt to 
selectively recruit more yes voters, assuming the no vote 
will remain constant; 4) attempt to selectively discourage 
participation of no voters, assuming yes vote remains 
constant; 5) attempt to change the net distribution of the 
normal vote division from less no to more yes choices 
(Piele & Hall, 1973, p.158).  
 
Given the findings from this study and the recent literature on 
school bond passage, we concur with Piele and Hall, and 
encourage administrators to work to recruit yes voters while 
following the bond characteristics recommendations stated above.  
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